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Abstract
Social media are vulnerable to deceptive social bots, which can im-
personate humans to amplify misinformation and manipulate opinions.
Little is known about the large-scale consequences of such pollution oper-
ations. Here we introduce an agent-based model of information spreading
with quality preference and limited individual attention to evaluate the
impact of different strategies that bots can exploit to pollute the network
and degrade the overall quality of the information ecosystem. We find
that penetrating a critical fraction of the network is more important than
generating attention-grabbing content and that targeting random users is
more damaging than targeting hub nodes. The model is able to reproduce
empirical patterns about exposure amplification and virality of low-quality
information. We discuss insights provided by our analysis, with a focus
on the development of countermeasures to increase the resilience of social
media users to manipulation.
1 Introduction
It has become increasingly clear in recent years that social media and their
users are vulnerable to manipulation by various means such as astroturf [1, 2],
trolling [3], impersonation [4], and misinformation [5, 6, 7, 8]. The vulnerabilities
of people and platforms to these kinds of manipulation can be attributed to a
complex interplay of socio-cognitive [9, 10], political [8], and algorithmic [11, 12]
biases. In addition to interacting and reinforcing each other, these biases are
exploited by social media accounts controlled in part by software, commonly
called social bots [13].
Some social bots are designed with benign intentions and serve useful pur-
poses [14, 15]. However, social bots also have many harmful applications; by
impersonating human users they can deceptively pollute our information ecosys-
tem to influence people and systems. Such inauthentic accounts are used to
amplify misinformation [16], create the appearance that people or opinions are
more popular than they are [1], influence public opinion [17, 18, 2, 19], com-
mit financial fraud [20], infiltrate vulnerable communities [21, 3, 22], or disrupt
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communication [23, 24]. This paper focuses on such malicious applications of
social bots.
There is a growing research literature on machine learning algorithms to de-
tect social bots [25, 26, 27, 13, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. This is a difficult adversarial
problem, as more sophisticated bots are designed to counter detection tools [33].
Some social bots behave in ways that cannot be distinguished by those of hu-
mans on an individual basis because automation is mixed with human behavior,
or because their behaviors are driven by (or copied from) humans; automation
is used mainly to replicate a behavior across many inauthentic accounts. Su-
pervised learning cannot recognize these so-called cyborgs [34]. Unsupervised
learning can be used to cluster accounts based on coordinated patters in tim-
ing, content, or network features [35, 36, 37]. But these approaches have limited
scalability and therefore a significant amount of social media manipulation re-
mains undetected. Despite steps reportedly taken by social media platforms to
curb malicious accounts [38, 39], we expect social bots to continue to pollute
our information ecosystem.
We can measure the effectiveness of social bots in certain pollution operations
and in specific domains, such as the spread of low-credibility information [16].
Yet, due to both ethical and data availability limitations, it is difficult to carry
out empirical experiments and analyses in the real world to measure the large-
scale consequences of such pollution operations on human behavior. There are
conflicting accounts, for example, about whether disinformation campaigns on
social media may have swayed elections [40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45]. To the extent
that humans are influenced by the information to which they are exposed, it is
reasonable to theorize that their behavior can be manipulated or controlled if
a malicious coordinated attack is able to control the flow of information on an
online social network. Nothing is known, however, about the power of social
bots to disrupt information ecosystem on such a global scale.
In this paper we introduce a social media model to explore scenarios in
which social bots manipulate an information sharing network and to evaluate
the impact of different bot strategies to pollute and degrade the overall quality
of the information ecosystem. Each piece of information that can be shared
and reshared, such as an image, link, hashtag, or phrase, is referred to as a
meme [46]. The underlying agent-based model accounts for limited attention by
agents, which can give rise to heavy-tailed distributions of meme popularity and
lifetime consistent with empirical data [47]. We assign a quality value to each
meme and assume that agents select and reshare memes shared by their friends
with probability proportional to their perceived quality. This approach allows
us to evaluate the impact of different strategies that bots can exploit to pollute
the network and degrade the overall quality of the information ecosystem.
The information-spreading model with limited attention and quality prefer-
ence was introduced in a prior paper, where we found that the correlation be-
tween meme quality and popularity degrades with increasing information load
and/or decreasing individual attention [48]. In that paper we also explored
whether the model was able to explain the empirical finding that low-quality
information is as likely to spread in a viral fashion as high-quality information.
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Our initial analysis suggested this to be the case. However, we later discovered
an error in the analysis; the model was in fact unable to generate equal distri-
butions of popularity for low- and high-quality memes, therefore we retracted
the paper [49]. In the present paper, we revisit this question and find that the
presence of manipulation by social bots is sufficient to explain the empirical
virality patterns of low-quality information.
The social media model presented here suggests that bots can be used to
pollute the information ecosystem, amplifying exposure to low-quality informa-
tion as observed in empirical data [16]. Our analysis sheds light on effective
manipulation strategies. In particular, we show that infiltrating the network is
more important than generating attention-grabbing (e.g., novel or compelling)
content. Contrary to intuition, we also find that targeting hubs is a less de-
structive strategy than targeting random users. These insights can help develop
countermeasures to increase the resilience of social media and their users to
manipulation. We discuss mitigation steps that could be taken by social media
platforms and the legal issues that arise from government regulations aimed at
protecting human speech from suppression by bots.
2 Methods
We aim to examine the conditions in which bots can displace quality infor-
mation. To this end, we propose a simple agent-based model inspired by the
long tradition of representing the spread of ideas as an epidemic process where
messages are passed along the edges of a network [50, 51, 52, 53]. We model a
social media platform for information sharing, such as Twitter or Instagram, as
a directed network. Nodes represent agents (users) and links represent follower
relations, which may or may not be reciprocal. The direction of the link goes
from the follower to the followed (friend) account, capturing attention; when
a friend’s post is reshared by a follower, information spreads in the opposite
direction.
2.1 Network Model
To model the presence of both humans and social bots, we assume that the sys-
tem consists of two subnetworks, with a parameter describing the ratio between
their sizes. Let the human subnetwork be composed of N nodes and the bot
subnetwork of βN nodes.
Both human and bot subnetworks have a structure that mimics online so-
cial networks. To capture the characteristic presence of hubs and clustering
(directed triads), we construct the two subnetworks using a directed variant of
the random-walk growth model [54]. Each network is initialized with four fully
connected nodes. Then we add one new node at a time, and assume that each
has fixed out-degree kout. Once a new node i comes into the network, it links
to a randomly selected target node j. Each of the remaining kout − 1 friends
are selected as follows: with probability expressed by a parameter p, i follows a
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the network structure. Human (blue) and
bot (red) nodes are depicted by different icons. Solid links indicate follower
relations within each subnetwork. Dashed links represent humans following
bots, according to the infiltration parameter γ.
random friend of j’s; with probability 1−p, i follows another randomly selected
node. Following friends of a friend is akin to copying links; this has the effect
of generating closed directed triads and approximates a preferential attachment
process, giving rise to hub nodes with high in-degree.
In addition, the bot subnetwork is designed to manipulate information flow
and collective attention by amplifying the spread of certain messages and the
influence of certain accounts. Therefore we assume that bots get human ac-
counts to follow them: we add a directed link from each human node to each
bot node with probability γ. The parameter γ models the infiltration of the hu-
man network by bots: when γ = 0 there is no infiltration and bots are isolated,
therefore harmless; the opposite extreme γ = 1 indicates complete penetration
such that bots dominate the network. Fig. 1 illustrates the network structure.
In the scheme described above, irrespective of the infiltration parameter
γ, the humans that follow the bots are selected by random wiring. To study
whether bots can manipulate the network more efficiently by targeting influ-
ential human accounts, we also explore a preferential wiring strategy. Each
bot is still followed by γN humans on average, but these human targets are
selected with probability proportional to their in-degree kin, i.e., their number
of followers.
2.2 Social Media Model
Fig. 2 illustrates the dynamics of the social media model. In contrast with
classical epidemiological models, messages carrying new memes are continuously
introduced into the system in an exogenous fashion. At each time step one agent
i is chosen at random. With probability µ, i produces a message carrying a new
meme. Alternatively, with probability 1 − µ, i selects one of the messages in
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Figure 2: Illustration of information diffusion in the social media model. Each
node has a news feed of limited size α, containing messages posted or reposted
by friends. Messages propagate along follower links (dashed arrows). At each
time step, an agent is considered (gray node). With probability µ, the node
posts a new message (here, m20). Otherwise, with probability 1− µ, the agent
scans its feed and reposts one of the messages according to their fitness (here,
m2). The message propagate to the node’s followers along the solid arrows and
shows up at the top of their feeds.
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its news feed to be reposted. The parameter µ measures the average number of
memes received by an agent per unit time, and represents the information load
of the agents in the network.
The new or reposted message is added to the news feeds of i’s followers.
Each agent’s feed contains the α most recent messages posted or reposted by
their friends; if a feed exceeds α messages, the oldest is forgotten. Although
social media platforms do not rank posts in strict reverse chronological order,
this is a realistic simplifying assumption because all platforms give high priority
to recent posts. The parameter α models the number of memes viewed in a
news feed during a session, and represents the finite attention of the agents.
To measure how bot activity can manipulate information diffusion, we as-
sume that each meme is characterized by two properties: quality and fitness.
Quality may represent desirable properties that make the meme more likely to
be shared, depending on the situation being modeled: the originality of an idea,
the beauty of a picture, and the truthfulness of a claim are valid examples. Fit-
ness, on the other hand, represents quality as perceived by human agents; it is
the likelihood that a meme is actually shared. In an ideal world, fitness would
equal quality. In the real world, however, deceptive messages may have low
quality and high fitness. For example, false news and junk science articles have
low quality — we would not share them if we knew their true nature. Yet they
may go viral because of deceptive content that is novel, click-bait, ripped from
headlines, and/or that appeals to people’s political, emotional, or conspiratorial
bias. In fact, these deceptive features may make low-quality content even more
likely to spread virally than high-quality content [6].
We model the dichotomy between meme quality q and fitness f by assuming
that memes originating from humans have fitness reflecting their quality (q = f)
whereas bot memes have low quality (q = 0) but deceptively high fitness. Both
q and f are defined in the unit interval. The potential difference in fitness due to
the deceptive nature of bot-amplified content is modeled by drawing the fitness
of human and bot memes from the two respective distributions:
Ph(f) =
(1− f)φ∫ 1
0
(1− f)φdf
= (1 + φ)(1− f)φ (1)
Pb(f) =
(1− f)1/φ∫ 1
0
(1− f)1/φdf
= (1 + 1/φ)(1− f)1/φ (2)
where φ ≥ 1 is a deception parameter that captures the differential in fitness.
As shown in Fig. 3, if φ = 1, bots and humans generate memes with fitness
drawn from the same distribution P (f) = 2(1 − f). If φ > 1, bot memes are
more likely to have high fitness; the larger φ, the greater the potential virality
of low-quality content amplified by bots.
Humans pay attention to memes shared by their friends. An agent does not
know the real quality of the memes in its feed; we assume that the probability
that it shares one of these memes, allowing it to spread, is proportional to
the meme’s fitness. More explicitly, let Mi be the feed of i (|Mi| = α). The
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Figure 3: Distributions of fitness for human and bot memes, regulated by the
deception parameter φ.
probability of message m ∈ Mi being selected is P (m) = f(m)/
∑
j∈Mi f(j)
where f(m) is the fitness of the meme carried by m.
2.3 Descriptive Metrics
We wish to quantify three desirable properties of the information ecosystem:
the average quality and diversity of the memes in the network, and the system’s
capacity to discriminate information on the basis of its quality. Next we define
three metrics that capture these properties. Our subsequent analyses aim to
evaluate information ecosystem pollution by measuring the changes in these
metrics in response to bot strategies.
Average quality measures how the injection of low-quality memes by bots
affects the overall quality of the information ecosystem. We calculate it by
averaging quality across all the memes visible through the feeds of all the human
agents:
Q =
1
αN
N∑
i=1
∑
m∈Mi
qim,
where qim is the quality of the meme in the mth message of user i’s feed.
Information diversity is another desirable property of an ideal communi-
cation system, because without diversity of ideas there can be no room for
informed discussions and decisions. Due to people’s limited attention, the injec-
tion and amplification of low-quality memes by bots could suppress the diversity
of quality information in the system. We use entropy to measure the amount of
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diversity in the human network:
D =
∑
m
P (m) logP (m),
where P (m) is the fraction of messages containing meme m across all the feeds
of users in the human network. The minimum diversity is zero, which means
there is a single meme dominating the entire ecosystem.
There is a trade-off between average quality and diversity in the network,
because the maximum quality may be obtained by having the best meme take
over the system, which would kill the diversity. Ideally, in the presence of
both high quality and diversity, one would want the system to discriminate
against low-quality memes by reaching a strong correlation between quality
and popularity: the higher the quality of a meme, the more widely it should be
shared among human users. We capture this discriminative power by measuring
Kendall’s rank correlation between popularity and quality of human-generated
memes. The popularity of a meme is measured by counting its occurrences in
the feeds of human agents, i.e., the number of times it is shared or reshared.
Kendall’s correlation coefficient is computed by ranking memes according to
the two criteria and then counting the number of meme pairs for which the two
rankings are concordant or discordant, properly accounting for ties [55]:
τ =
nc − nd√
(nc + nd + n
q
t )(nc + nd + n
p
t )
where nc is the number of concordant pairs, nd the number of discordant pairs,
nqt the number of ties only in quality, and n
p
t the number of ties only in pop-
ularity. High τ indicates that high-quality memes are more likely to go viral,
granting the system discriminative power; in the extreme case τ = 1 the two
rankings are completely concordant. Small τ signifies a lack of quality discrim-
ination by the network.
2.4 Simulation Framework
The parameters µ and α that regulate information load and limited attention
have been explored in previous work [48] and shown to decrease the correlation
between quality and popularity of memes (Fig. 4). We use α = 15, which is the
approximate average scrolling session depth measured on a social media mobile
app; and we draw µ from an empirical distribution of tweet (vs. retweet) rates
on Twitter. The distribution has average 〈µ〉 ≈ 0.75 and is peaked at µ = 1. We
set the value of β = 0.1 based on the empirical finding that 9–15% of Twitter
accounts use automation [30]. For the remaining parameters, we use N = 104
nodes, kout = 3, and p = 0.5. Unless otherwise stated, the human followers of
the bots are selected at random.
We wish to study the characteristics of bot behaviors that pollute social
media platforms, as modeled by network infiltration and content deception.
Therefore we explore how desirable properties of the information ecosystem
deteriorate in response to different values of the γ and φ parameters.
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Figure 4: Map of discriminative power τ as a function of information load µ
and finite attention α. This data is based on a simplified version of the model
with no bots (β = 0), N = 1000 agents in an undirected network constructed
by preferential attachment [56], 〈k〉 = 20, and constant µ [48]. The two small
networks (N = 128) illustrate how the discriminative power decreases with
larger µ (α = 10, µ = 0.2, 0.9). Node color and size represent the last shared
meme and its quality, respectively.
For each set of parameters, we analyze the behavior of the social media model
by simulating the information diffusion process on a directed network generated
through the above method. As the competition takes place, some of the memes
die fast while others live longer and infect a large fraction of the network. Such
a process continues until the systems reaches a steady state in which the average
number of distinct memes remains roughly constant (this number depends on
µ). In our analysis, we only consider the memes that are introduced after the
system reaches the steady state. Then we monitor 106 memes from their birth
until they completely disappear from the human system. We record each meme’s
quality and popularity during this steady-state stage.
Each simulation is run 20 times, starting from random conditions, for a total
of 2×107 memes that are included in our analysis. The measurements of average
quality, diversity, and discriminative power are averaged across simulation runs.
3 Results
The social media model allows us to explore the effects of different bot pollution
strategies: infiltration of the network, deceptive content, and targeting of influ-
ential human users. In this section we present the results of these analyses and
then compare the predictions of the model with some empirical observations.
3.1 Effects of Pollution
To quantify the effects of bot strategies on pollution, we measured average
quality, diversity, and discriminative power after running simulations of our
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information ecosystem model for different values of the infiltration parameter
(10−3 ≤ γ ≤ 1) and the deception parameter (1 ≤ φ ≤ 10). The results are
shown in Fig.5.
Not surprisingly, the system is most robust to pollution when both the in-
filtration of bots into the human social network (γ) and their deception (φ) are
minimal. Both bot infiltration and deception have a clear negative impact on
the average quality of information in the system; the higher γ and φ, the lower
the average information quality. We also note an abrupt, non-linear transition
toward low quality when humans follow 1% or more of the bots. For γ above this
level, quality is suppressed so much that bot deception makes little difference.
One might expect highly deceptive bot memes to displace human memes and
therefore suppress information diversity. However, we observe that the diversity
does not depend in a significant way on the deception level φ. Bot infiltration
does have a strong negative effect on diversity, but only when γ is sufficiently
high — again we note a sharp transition around 1%.
Similar to diversity, the discriminative power of the human network degrades
mainly as a result of the increase in bot infiltration γ. When the deception φ is
large, the capacity to distinguish good memes decreases gradually even as bots
infiltrate the network very marginally. When φ is small, on the other hand, the
discriminative power remains high for small γ and then drops abruptly as bot
infiltration passes the critical threshold γ ≈ 1%.
3.2 Targeting Influential Users
The above results show that bots can destroy the health of the information
ecosystem if they are able to penetrate a sufficient fraction of the human net-
work. This infiltration assumes that the human followers of the bots are selected
randomly with equal probability. But those interested in manipulating the net-
work through bots may be able to target influential nodes. This is well within
the capability of automated accounts; for example, the number of followers is of-
ten used as a proxy for influence [57] and is public information for most Twitter
and Instagram accounts, as well as Facebook pages. A bot can easily interact
with accounts having many followers by mentioning and/or following them as
well as retweeting, quoting, and/or liking their tweets.
There is empirical evidence of preferential targeting in bots that spread mis-
information [1, 16]. Presumably this strategy is based on the assumption that
it can multiply the impact a bot, because a retweet by an influential human fol-
lower can reach many nodes. An important question, then, is whether targeting
influential human accounts by bots can in fact increase the harm of pollution.
Let us explore this question through a variation of our model in which links
from humans to bots are created in such a way that people with more followers
have a higher probability of following bots — the probability of a human node
being selected is proportional to the node’s in-degree kin. The model is otherwise
identical to the one discussed so far. To compare the pollution effects of the
two targeting strategies, we plot in Fig. 6 the ratio Qpref/Qrand between the
average quality of the preferential and random wiring models.
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Figure 5: Pollution effects measured by average meme quality Q (top), meme
diversity D (middle), and discriminative power τ (bottom) as a function of
infiltration probability γ (10−3 ≤ γ ≤ 1) and deception level φ. The charts on
the left focus on three values of φ, while the density plots on the right map the
range 1 ≤ φ ≤ 10 and use colors to represent the metric values. Only memes
created by humans and their spread in the human system are considered.
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Figure 6: Ratio of average quality in preferential targeting vs. random wiring
strategies, Qpref/Qrand, for different values of infiltration γ and deception φ.
The dashed line is the baseline where the two strategies produce equal harm.
Colored bands around the curves represent 95% confidence intervals based on
20 simulations.
For extremely low bot infiltration, preferential targeting is slightly more de-
structive than random wiring, but the wiring strategy has little influence on
the pollution outcome when γ ≤ 1%. When the infiltration is sufficiently high
(γ > 1%), surprisingly, we observe the opposite effect Qpref > Qrand: the pref-
erential targeting model is significantly less effective at suppressing the quality
of the information ecosystem compared to random wiring. At the extreme
γ = 1, naturally, the wiring strategy is irrelevant because all humans follow
bots. Different deception levels do not affect these results.
These results mean that a (destructive) advantage of targeting hub nodes
can only be seen if very few humans follow the bots. Otherwise, targeting hubs
actually mitigates the harm to the information ecosystem. Further inspection
to interpret this counterintuitive finding reveals that targeting hubs leads to a
greater concentration of low-quality content in the network, which is reflected in
a higher average quality. For an illustration, consider the networks visualized in
Fig. 7. When the infiltration is low (γ = 1%), preferential targeting pollutes a
few hubs. For high infiltration (γ = 10%), random wiring results in a spread of
the low-quality information across the network. Preferential targeting instead
concentrates the low-quality memes among the hubs, leaving many low-degree
nodes free from pollution. This concentration makes the targeting of influential
accounts less deleterious to the ecosystem.
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γ = 1% γ = 10%
Figure 7: Visualizations of network pollution by bots under random (top) and
preferential (bottom) wiring strategies and different infiltration levels γ, with
deception φ = 5. Red and blue nodes represent bots and humans, respectively.
The darker a blue node, the more bad (q = 0) memes in their feed. Node size
represents the number of followers.
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3.3 Empirical Virality and Amplification
Our model is an extremely simplified representation of the real, complex social
media platforms we use everyday. A key question, then, is whether the stylized
facts presented above provide a realistic picture of how social bot behaviors
can pollute our actual information ecosystems. While it is hard to imagine
ethical experiments that could validate our model predictions, we can compare
some of our findings with existing empirical data to see whether our results are
consistent with patterns observed in the real world.
One set of empirical observations concerns the comparison between the viral-
ity of high- and low-quality information. Our previous analyses [48, 16] showed
that the popularity distributions of true and false news on Facebook, and of
articles from low-quality and fact-checking sources on Twitter, are practically
indistinguishable, as shown in Fig. 8(a,b). Without bots, the model is unable to
generate equal distributions of popularity for low- and high-quality memes [49].
In the presence of low-infiltration and low-deception bots, however, the model
can reproduce equal distributions (Fig. 8(c)). Using higher values of the bot in-
filtration and deception parameters γ and φ, the model predicts that low-quality
information can be even more likely to go viral than high-quality information, as
illustrated in Fig. 8(d–h). These results are consistent with empirical analyses
comparing the virality of accurate and debunked news on Twitter [6].
For a second empirical observation, let us consider how human exposure to
low-quality information can be amplified by the sharing activity of social bots,
based on our prior analysis of the spread of low-credibility articles on Twit-
ter [16]. Fig. 9(a) plots the estimated numbers of tweets linking to articles from
low-credibility sources by likely humans vs. bots, separated using a threshold on
bot scores calculated by the Botometer tool [30, 33]. Irrespective of the thresh-
old, the volume of human tweets per article Vh grows faster than the volume
of bot tweets for article Vb; fitting a power law Vh = V
η
b , a super-linear rela-
tionship is indicated by the exponent η > 1: bots amplify the reach of articles
from low-credibility sources. No amplification effect was found for fact-checking
articles (η = 1). Fig. 9(b) shows that a similar super-linear relationship is pre-
dicted by our model for low-quality memes. To estimate the exponent, we plot
η = log Vhlog Vb in Fig. 9(c). We observe η > 1, consistent with the empirical results:
bots amplify the spread of low-quality information.
4 Discussion
Simulations of our social media model in the presence of deceptive social bots
reveal that both infiltrating the network and generating attention-grabbing con-
tent are effective bot strategies, but infiltration is the dominant factor in sup-
pressing quality. When bots can induce as little as 1% of the humans in the
network to follow them, there is a drastic transition toward suppression of qual-
ity. Surprisingly, unless infiltration is below this critical value, bots do not even
need to target influential users; they can do more damage by connecting to ran-
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Figure 8: Probability distributions of meme popularity. (a) Facebook shares
of news articles that support false claims or undermine true claims (low qual-
ity) and articles that fact-check false claim or support true claims (high qual-
ity); data from Emergent [48]. (b) Tweets of articles from low-credibility and
fact-checking sources (the numbers of article-sharing accounts have very similar
distributions); data from Hoaxy [16]. (c–h) Posts of low-quality (q = 0) and
high-quality (q > 0) memes in model simulations with different γ and φ values.
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Figure 9: Relationship between human and bot sharing of low-quality informa-
tion. The dashed lines are guides to the eye, showing linear growth; a super-
linear relationship is a signature of amplification by bots. (a) Volume of tweets
with links to articles from low-credibility sources by accounts with bot score
above a threshold versus the volume of tweets by accounts with bot score below
the threshold [16]. (b) Number of low-quality (q = 0) memes posted by bots ver-
sus humans in simulations of our model with γ = 0.5 and φ = 1. (c) Exponent
of the power-law relationship estimated by the model numbers in panel (b).
dom accounts. The model’s predictions are consistent with empirical findings
about the relative virality of low- and high-quality information on Twitter and
Facebook, and about amplification of low-quality information spread by social
bots on Twitter.
The results are robust to changes in the network size (103 ≤ N ≤ 104) and
structure. We experimented with different values of the link copy probability
parameter p, yielding networks with different clustering coefficients. We also
rule out the possibility that the results are affected by a bias in the directed
version of the random-walk model used to build the subnetworks. Early nodes
are more likely to become hubs with high in-degree, while later nodes tend to
follow older nodes without being followed by them (low or zero in-degree). We
repeated our simulations on networks generated with an additional rewiring
mechanism that eliminates these “dead-end” nodes. If a node i has kin = 0,
we randomly choose a node j with kin > 2 and rewire one of its outgoing links
toward i. In this way, the total in-degree and out-degree of the system remain
the same, but every node has at least one follower and is thus able to propagate
memes. Finally, we considered networks without clustering, generated with a
directed version of the preferential attachment model [56]. All of these network
structure variations yield results similar to those reported above and support
the same conclusions.
A wealth of previous models and experiments have focused on informa-
tion diffusion and popularity. Several studies have investigated the role played
by network mechanisms affecting the popularity of individual memes, includ-
ing exogenous and endogenous bursts of attention [58, 59], memory [60], nov-
elty [61, 62], and position bias [63, 64]. This literature considers the popularity
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of pieces of information in isolation. Markets in which many memes compete for
limited attention have received scarce consideration. Exceptions have considered
the cost of learning about quality [65], distortions of quality assessments that
result from aggregate knowledge of peer choices [66], and confirmation bias in
the spread of misinformation [67]. The social media model extends the model
of Weng et. al. [47], who demonstrated that some memes inevitably achieve
viral popularity irrespective of quality in the presence of competition among
networked agents with limited attention. Gleeson et. al. [68, 69] formalized this
model as a critical branching process, predicting that the popularity of memes
follows a power-law distribution with very heavy tails.
We can think of bots as zealots, a minority of agents committed to a par-
ticular view. Opinion dynamics models, such as the majority rule, voter, and
naming game models, have shown that even a small minority of zealots can
drive a system to consensus toward their opinion [70]. This also holds in high-
dimensional opinion spaces [71]. When the committed fraction grows beyond
a critical value, there is a dramatic decrease in the time taken for the entire
population to adopt the committed opinion [72]. Furthermore, when zealots are
more active in pushing their message, their efforts require an order of magnitude
fewer individuals to bring the population over to a new consensus, compared
to a randomly selected committed minority [73]. Although in the social media
model we only explore the bots’ capacity to pollute the network rather than to
drive consensus to a particular meme/opinion, these results suggest future work
in the direction of evaluating whether bots can sway social media users toward
a particular narrative.
The insights gained from the present findings suggest several countermea-
sures to increase the resilience of social media users to manipulation and protect
information ecosystems from pollution. The first lesson is that we must make it
more difficult for social bots to infiltrate the network. Social media platforms
are already stepping up their efforts in detecting and taking down abusive and
deceptive accounts [38, 39], but could further strengthen these efforts. This
could be accomplished by adding friction to following/friending actions, for ex-
ample warning users who attempt to link to accounts that lack a strong record
of human-like activity. Users should also be warned when friend accounts are
suspended or take suspicious actions, such as changing names/handles and/or
deleting their prior posts en masse. Expanding account verification programs
and bolstering bot detection research will also help.
Our findings suggest that all social media users, and not only the most influ-
ential, may be targeted by malicious bots. Literacy programs should therefore
be supported and expanded. Social media platforms could lead by educating
users about their vulnerabilities to manipulation by inauthentic accounts and
pages. Such literacy efforts could also cover deception — how to spot and ignore
content from low-credibility sources.
In our model, social bots exploit and amplify vulnerabilities created by infor-
mation overload and finite attention: bots can easily flood the system, crowding
out quality information in our feed. One way to counter this manipulation is to
reduce information load by adding friction to automated posts; accounts post-
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ing at very high rates should be challenged to prove that they are human. By
aggressively curbing this kind of abuse, social media platforms could improve
the overall quality of information to which we are exposed.
Ironically, efforts by social media platforms to suspend abusive and deceptive
bots have been criticized by some as censorship [74, 75]; even research on social
bot detection has been assailed with charges of free speech suppression [76].
Following a recent California law requiring disclosure when bots are used to
promote, say, political candidates [77], questions are being raised as to whether
bots should enjoy First Amendment rights [78] or journalistic protections [79].
The fundamental argument of critics of bot countermeasures — whether by
platforms or governments — is the concept of a free marketplace of ideas, rooted
in John Milton’s centuries-old reasoning that truth prevails in a free and open
encounter of ideas [80]. Unfortunately, several aspects of modern social media
challenge the assumptions of a free marketplace in which participants can access
and adopt better ideas [81]. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter have given rise
to the so-called attention economy [82, 83, 84] in which information production
is affected by information consumption [85]. Furthermore, while the wisdom
of the crowd enabled by social media [86] should facilitate the discrimination
of information based on quality by combining the opinions of many individu-
als [87], we cannot assume that the opinions to which we are exposed online
are independent. This leads to higher confidence and lower accuracy [88]. Sim-
ilarly, strategies such as accepting new information if it comes from multiple
sources [89] are vulnerable because a single entity can use bots to create the
appearance of popularity.
The findings presented here suggest that social bots can be used to suppress
human speech. Therefore, in the United States, a reading of the First Amend-
ment that grants bots (or any entity that controls them) unlimited free-speech
rights would seem to lead to a logical contradiction [90]. These questions are yet
to be addressed by the courts, and may have huge repercussions on regulations
designed to protect the information ecosystem from manipulation [81].
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